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Chapter 9 
BOLD SPEECH, OPPOSITION, AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
IMAGERY IN THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES 
Ruben R. Dupertuis 
Opposition is a central theme in the Acts of the Apostles. Success in spread­
ing the message of Christianity is not independent from conflict and suf­
fering, but is inextricably tied to it (Marguerat 2002: 39). The account of 
the death of Stephen is a notable element in the development of the theme, 
but it runs throughout the narrative. Indeed, as Richard Pervo notes, "con­
finement, including arrest, incarceration, and bondage, is a literal feature 
of more than one-third of Acts" (Pervo 2009: 11). Acts' stories of conflict 
with authorities have played a key role in developing and sustaining the 
widespread view that persecution and martyrdom have been central to the 
Christian experience from the earliest days of the Christian movement. The 
nature and function of the opposition in narrative of Acts, however, has long 
been the subject of debate. Does the emphasis on opposition and conflict 
capture the historical realities of the first Christians? Is this emphasis shaped 
by the author's theology and/or literary strategies? Whatever the historical 
realities may be, in what follows I suggest that the emphasis on opposition 
and conflict in Acts has the narrative function of constructing the heroes of 
the narrative as "true" philosophers. The author of Acts presents the leaders 
of the Christian movement to Theophilus, the educated reader (whether a 
person or a larger entity}, using widespread philosophical topoi that empha­
sized the conflict between the philosopher and a ruler or authority figure. 
The use of the figure of the philosopher at odds with a tyrant has a long 
history in Greek literature, but it becomes particularly prominent in sec­
ond-century philosophical literature and narratives. Reading Acts alongside 
some of these texts allows us to see that its stories of conflict and opposi­
tion, which are consistently linked to the term parresia and philosophical 
imagery, share striking similarities with some of the ways in which Greek 
authors of the late-first and second centuries imagined themselves into the 
structures of power. 
The term parresia has been called a "key word" in Acts (van Unnik 1980: 
279), appearing twelve times, including in Peter's first speech immediately 
after the outpouring of the Spirit in Acts 2 and prominently in the final 
153 
154 Ruben R. Dupertuis 
words of Acts describing Paul, imprisoned in Rome, "preaching the king­
dom of God and teaching the things of Lord Jesus Christ with all boldness 
(rrappriola5), unhindered" (Acts 28:31). But exactly what the significance 
of the free or bold speech that is attributed to the heroes of the narrative 
is remains the subject of continuing debate. While some make a distinction 
between the secular use of the term in pagan literature and the religious use 
of the term by New Testament writers (Morrow 1982: 439), as a number of 
recent studies have shown, the importance of the term parresia in Acts is 
probably better understood in relation to the term's enduring significance 
in Greek literature in a number of different settings, including discussions 
of democracy, Cynic philosophy, treatises on friendship, and in the self­
presentation of philosophers (see Schlier 1967; van Unnik 1980; and the 
essays in Fitzgerald 1996; Fields 2009). It is the latter that I want to focus on 
here, as I will suggest in this essay that Acts' use of the term parresia should 
be seen in the context of the widespread topos of the philosopher willing 
to speak the truth to the powerful despite the consequences and functions 
rhetorically, therefore, as a marker of philosophical identity. These features 
come into focus by reading Acts alongside Greek authors of the late-first 
and second centuries, such as Dio Chryssostom and Lucian, who use the 
term and associated philosophical topoi as part of a complex appropriation 
of Greek identity in a Roman world. 
Before turning to the use of the term, some brief observations about my 
approach are in order. The similarities I will put forward allow us to see 
aspects of Acts-in this case the prominent use of philosophical imagery­
not otherwise visible as clearly. However, I do not intend my use of com­
paranda that includes second-century authors such as Lucian to serve as an 
argument for dating Acts in the second century. While I do find the recent 
arguments for a second-century date-especially those of Pervo (2006) and 
Tyson (2006)- convincing, I do not consider the similarities I will suggest 
between Acts and late-first and second century authors to add to the evi­
dence they have adduced. Similarly, I do not intend to suggest through my 
use of authors associated with the literary movement known as the Second 
Sophistic that Acts should to be considered a Second Sophistic text (for dis­
cussion of Acts in this context see, Gilbert 2006; Nasrallah 2008; and Chapter 
11 in this volume). Rather, reading Acts in the light of authors of the second 
century is part of a robust contextualization of Acts in the ancient world, and 
one not constrained by the tendency in the study of the New Testament to 
limit comparanda to Jewish and Greek literature that is earlier than Acts (for 
similar approaches, see Darr 1998; Penner & Vander Stichele 2007). Whether 
one dates Acts in the late-first or early-second century, authors of the second 
century, many of whom can be associated with the Second Sophistic move­
ment, are enough a part of the larger cultural orbit of Acts to shed light on 
aspects of the narrative other comparanda might not allow us to see as clearly 
(contra Adams 2010). 
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PARRESIA AMONG THE PHILOSOPHERS 
The term parresia first emerges as a key term of Greek (and particularly 
Athenian) democracy in the fifth century BCE denoting the right of free citi­
zens to participate in politics. Heinrich Schlier (1967: 872-3) identified three 
ways in which the term is used in this political context: a sense that empha­
sizes the right to speak or to say anything; a sense that emphasizes the rela­
tionship between parresia and truth, thus connoting the need to say what 
needs to be said; and a sense that identifies the link between parresia and 
opposition, thus suggesting that to say what needs to be said may require 
the courage to do so despite potentially negative consequences. All three 
aspects of the term are closely associated with the rights of full citizens of the 
democratic polis . That free speech could be seen as a defining characteristic 
of the citizen of the polis is suggested by Euripides' claim that the hardest 
part of exile is "not having free speech" (ouK 'exe1 rrappeolav; Phoen. 390-91; 
see also Euripides, Hipp. 421-2 and Ion 672; Demosthenes, 3 Philip. 3-4; 
Aristophanes, Thesm. 541; Schlier 1967: 872-3; and Fields 2009: 21-3). 
While parresia as the right to free speech in a democratic context is a 
possible meaning later, by the mid-fourth century BCE and certainly in later 
philosophical discourse, the basis of parresia shifts from a right accorded 
citizens to a moral virtue. This shift occurs as early as "Socrates as reported 
by Plato, [for whom] the term signifies not free and frank speech as a contri­
bution in the Assembly or some other institutional context, but the frank and 
open statement of one's genuine opinion in the context of personal interac­
tion" (Fields 2009: 23; see also Schlier 1967: 874-5). So for Cynics, as citizens 
of the world and friends of the gods, it is a moral and individual right to 
speak freely and to speak the truth-and it becomes among philosophers the 
necessary treatment, however harsh, for the moral ailments of society. Both 
Philodemus (Lib. frag. 64) and Dio Chrysostom (Or. 33.6; Or. 77/78.45), for 
example, use the image of the philosopher as a physician who uses parresia 
to heal the sick of society. 
Some philosophers, again particularly Cynics, became associated with 
abrasive speech and were accused of misusing parresia to justify loidoria, 
berating or reviling the masses.• Epictetus, for example, tells a prospective 
philosopher that he misunderstands the calling of the Cynic if he sees it as 
limited to having "a contemptible wallet, a staff, and big jaws; to devour eve­
rything you give him or stow it away, or to revile tactlessly [f..018ope108m] the 
people he meets" (3.22.51; Oldfather, trans.). Similar critiques of inappropri­
ate use of parresia were not uncommon (cf. Philodemus, Lib. frag. 72, col. 13; 
Philo, Somn. 2.83.89; Plutarch, Pomp. 60.4; Lucian, Demon. 48; Vit. auct. 10; 
Pisc. 31; and Peregr. 18). That an extensive literature on the appropriate use 
of parresia in a number of different settings arises, suggests that the legiti­
mating function of the term in cultural or rhetorical terms was significant 
and worth the effort to be able to claim it for oneself. Put another way, the 
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importance of the term, as Dana Fields has argued in her fine study, is related 
to its ability to function as a "tool for self-positioning" (Fields 2009: 200). 
I focus here on three related aspects of the function of the term parresia 
in the characterization of the philosopher that stand out and will be useful 
for the subsequent assessment of the function of the term in Acts; they are: 
(a) the association of parresia and conflict with ruling authorities; (b) divine 
commission as the source of parresia; and (c) the significance of Socrates as 
the model for later philosophers. 
Parresia and opposition 
The association between parresia and opposition is already present in the 
Athenian democratic context, but it becomes a central feature of the topos 
of the philosopher's opposition to the tyrant in later periods. As John Darr 
has noted, "confrontation with tyranny became the sine qua non of the true 
philosopher" (Darr 1998: 107). In Diogenes Laertius's account of the philoso­
phers, parresia often refers to the bold or outspoken nature of philosophers 
leading, at times, to rebuke, exile, and death (Diog. Laert. 2.102; 2.130; 5; cf. 
1.101; 2.123; 2.127; 4.51; 6.69). In the early imperial period there are numer­
ous stories of first-century philosophers suffering in one way or another at 
the hands of emperors. The most common punishment was exile, although 
examples of philosophers being sentenced to death exist (see Whitmarsh 
2001: 134 n. 5). Whatever the real reasons for the banishing of philosophers, 
their exile was often linked to the philosophers' parresia. An example can be 
seen in Musonius Rufus's challenge to the civic definition of parresia sug­
gested by Euripides: 
But I should say in rejoinder to Euripides: "You are right, 
Euripides, when you say that it is the condition of a slave not to 
say what one thinks when one ought to speak, for it is not always, 
nor everywhere, nor before everyone that we should say what 
we think. But one point, it seems to me, is not well-taken, that 
exiles do not have freedom of speech [ rrapp11ola5 ], if to you free­
dom of speech [ rrapp11oia] means not suppressing whatever one 
chances to think. For it is not as exiles that men fear to say what 
they think, but as men afraid lest from speaking pain or death or 
punishment or some other such thing shall befall them. Fear is 
the cause of this, not exile. For to many people, nay to most, even 
though dwelling safely in their native city, fear of what seem to 
them dire consequences of free speech is present. However, the 
courageous man, in exile no less than at home, is dauntless in the 
face of all such fears; for that reason also he has the courage to say 
what he thinks equally at home or in exile:· 
(Musonius Rufus 9.86-105; Lutz, trans.) 
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For Musonius the true philosopher's freedom comes from the need to speak 
the truth regardless of the consequences, which include exile-Musonius's 
focus in this passage-and possibly death. 
Dio Chrysostom also links parresia and opposition. For Dio, in fact, speak­
ing in such a way as to avoid negative consequences is precisely the opposite of 
what the true philosopher ought to do. He describes those who abuse parresia 
as men who use it "sparingly, not in such a way as to fill your ears therewith nor 
for any length of time; nay they merely utter a phrase or two, and then, after 
berating [> .. 01oopr1aavTE5] rather than enlightening you, they make a hurried 
exit" (Or. 32.11; Cohoon & Crosby, trans.). An ideal philosopher, in contrast, 
is one who "in plain terms and without guile speaks his mind with frankness 
[ rrappT]maf;oµevov] and neither for the sake of reputation nor for gain makes 
false pretensions, but out of good will and concern for his fellow-men stands 
ready, if need be, to submit to ridicule and to the disorder and the uproar of 
the mob" (Or. 32.11, Cohoon & Crosby, trans.; see also Or. 8). Dio, like Muso­
nius, makes a connection between the true philosopher and the willingness to 
speak the truth despite the consequences. Also like Musonius, Dio wears the 
badge of exile proudly as the mark of his philosophical identity. 
Tim Whitmarsh has shown that in the Greek literature of the first and 
second century CE, "exile was not simply a tool of imperial repression: it was 
also appropriated by its victims (and no doubt by others, too) as a rhetorical 
resource through which individual agents could articulate their own philo­
sophical status" (Whitmarsh 2001: 135). He further notes that for some first 
and second century authors-his primary examples are Musonius Rufus and 
Dio Chrysostom-exile becomes a kind of badge or marker of philosophical 
success (ibid.: 138). This is, for example, how Lucian understands Dio's exile 
(Peregr. 18). 
The close connections between parresia, opposition, and philosophical 
identity become evident in Lucian's Passing of Peregrinus, which is worth a 
closer look. Setting aside questions of the accuracy of Lucian's description of 
the Cynic philosopher, Lucian's sustained attack of Peregrinus turns on the 
issue of the true vs the false philosopher (something that he tackles specifi­
cally in The Dead Come to Life, or 7he Fisherman). In the case of Peregrinus, 
what is ironically lamentable for the narrator is the way in which Peregri­
nus's philosophical credentials are created and sustained by followers who 
misconstrue his actions. Peregrinus's life has all of the right indicators for 
the title "philosopher" to apply to him, but how he gets them is never quite 
legitimate. For example, he experiences exile for the first time after news that 
he murdered his father begins to spread, but rather than being banished by 
a tyrant, he "condemned himself to exile and roamed about, going to one 
country after another" (Peregr. 10; Harmon & McLoud, trans.). Shortly there­
after he joins the Christians by whom he is revered as a god, lawgiver, and 
protector, second only to "the man who was crucified in Palestine because 
he introduced this new cult into the world" (Peregr. 11; Harmon & McLoud, 
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trans.). When he is subsequently apprehended, it is not entirely clear that it is 
anything Peregrinus has done other than simply join the existing movement 
(Peregr. 12). This arrest, however, results in a growing reputation, the atten­
tion and visits of the Christians, and the title "the New Socrates:' And his sub­
sequent release takes place precisely because the philosophy-loving governor 
of Syria does not consider him worthy and recognizes that Peregrinus would 
gladly die in prison for the reputation that would afford (Peregr. 14)-rather 
than die like a man/Socrates. Peregrinus's arrival in Rome is marked by a 
confrontation with the emperor, but with a twist: Peregrinus begins "abusing 
[eA01cSopf1to] everyone, and in particular the emperor;' but does so because 
he knows himself to be safe given the emperor's mild and gentle manner, and 
the emperor does not care since he can see through the performance (Peregr. 
18; Harmon & McLoud, trans.). He is eventually kicked out of Rome, but by 
a prefect, not the emperor. This, unfortunately, added to Peregrinus's philo­
sophical credentials: 
However, this too made for his renown, and he was on everybody's 
lips as the philosopher who had been banished for his frankness 
[ rrappriol av] and excessive freedom, so that in this respect he 
approache.d Musonius, Dio, Epictetus, and anyone else who has 
been in a similar predicament. 
(Peregr. 18; Harmon & McLoud, trans.) 
For Lucian, then, Peregrinus's regrettable reputation as a philosopher 
depends precisely on his having or at least appearing to have key mark­
ers of philosophical identity: arrest, confrontation with the emperor, and 
banishment. In Lucian's satire, of course, these markers are unearned and 
unwarranted and more of a joke than anything else. That said, we can learn 
something about the signifiers of the "true philosopher" none the less. 
Parresia and divine commission 
For some philosophers the basis of parresia is not simply Cynic self-con­
fidence, but rather, divine commission. While the authority of poets can 
occasionally be linked to a gift of the gods, accounts of divine commis­
sions are most commonly associated with philosophers (see the discussion 
in Czachesz 2007: 44-52). Immediately following Dio's description of the 
true philosopher who is willing to speak out regardless of possible derision 
or worse, he states, "In my own case, for instance, I feel that I have chosen 
that role, not of my own volition, but by the will of some deity" (Or. 32.12; 
Cohoon & Crosby, trans.). Dio makes a similar claim to divine commis­
sion elsewhere, this time with specific Socratic coloring (Or. 13.9.12). 
Epictetus, too, understands the true Cynic as a messenger and a scout 
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"sent by Zeus to men" (3.22.23-5; Oldfather, trans.; cf. 3.25.56). Diogenes 
Laertius identifies divine authority as the source for the teachings of some 
philosophers. For example, he describes Pythagoras as receiving "most of 
his moral doctrines from the Delphic priestess Themistocleia" (Diog. Laert. 
8.8; Hicks, trans.). When discussing Epicurus, Diogenes presents an epi­
gram by Athenaeus in which the philosopher's teaching is identified as 
coming from "the Muses or from the sacred tripod at Delphi" (Diog. Laert. 
10.12; Hicks, trans.). Diogenes attributes the source of Epimenides' author­
ity, power, and miraculous longevity-he lived to the age of 157 in one 
tradition, 299 in another-to a fifty-seven-year-long nap that marked him 
as a favorite of the gods ( 1.109-15). And Philostratus roots the authority 
of the teaching of Apollonius of Tyana in his ability to converse with the 
gods ( Vit. Apoll. 1.1). 
The most well-known and influential divine commission is that of Socra­
tes, whose mission, according to his biographers, is authorized by the oracle 
at Delphi (Plato, Apo/. 20e-22a; Xenophon, Mem. 1.3.1). This "call;' as Love­
day Alexander ( l 993b: 58) puts it, "provided a template for a number of other 
'call' stories attached to the lives of philosophers:· It is worth noting that 
the link between Socrates' mission and a divine commission is repeatedly 
stressed in the First Epistle of Socrates (2, 7, 10), which probably dates to the 
first or second century CE (for the text, see Malherbe 1977). 
The Socratic model 
The importance of the figure of Socrates in the construction of later philo­
sophical identities is not limited to his divine commission. By the early Roman 
imperial period, Socrates had become the pre-eminent martyr, the prototype 
of the philosopher unjustly accused, tried, and executed. Alexander notes 
that given the substantial literary tradition surrounding him, the figure of 
Socrates is in an entirely different position than other philosophers (L. C. A.  
Alexander 1993b: 57-8). Thanks, in part, to the prominence of Plato and to 
a lesser degree Xenophon in rhetorical and literary training, the influence of 
Socrates extends far beyond philosophical circles (Dupertuis 2007). Plato's 
more well-known dialogues were, by the first century CE, dialogues that the 
cultivated person was expected to know (Trapp 2000: 236-7). 
It is not surprising, then, that the death of Socrates was among the most 
imitated models of how to die nobly (Sterling 2001; L. C. A. Alexander 
1993b). When Plutarch recounts the death of Cato the Younger, he does so 
with the death of Socrates as his literary template (Cat. Min. 66.4-70.6). Like 
Socrates, Cato calms his friends and refuses their efforts to save him. Plu­
tarch also mentions that Cato read through Plato's Phaedo twice on the night 
of his death. Dio draws on the Socratic paradigm explicitly as he takes on 
Socrates' voice in Or. 13 which deals with his banishment by Domitian in 
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82 CE. Lucian also uses traditions of Socrates' death explicitly in his account 
of the Stoic philosopher Demonax. For these and other writers, including the 
authors of Jewish martyrologies (Kloppenborg 1992; Sterling 2001), Socra­
tes became the ideal model of a maligned philosopher willing to die for his 
beliefs (Whitmarsh, 2001: 133-80; see also Fields 2009). 
An interesting second-century example of the way in which Socrates 
becomes emblematic of the true philosopher's willingness to speak the truth 
comes from Justin Martyr, who in telling of his confrontation with Crescens­
the man accused in later tradition of bringing about Justin's death-calls out 
the Cynic philosopher for opposing Christianity without having read the 
teachings of Christ. Justin challenges Crescens to a second public debate, this 
time before the emperor: 
But if my questions and his answers have been made known to 
you, you are already aware that he is acquainted with none of 
our matters; or, if he is acquainted with them, but, through fear 
of those who might hear him does not dare to speak out, like 
Socrates, he proves himself, as I said before, no philosopher, but 
lover of vainglory; at least he disregards the admirable saying of 
Socrates: "But man must in no wise be honored before truth:' 
(2 Apo/. 3; Barnard, trans.) 
Although Justin doesn't use the term parresia, he does underscore the idea 
that the mark of the true philosopher is daring to speak despite the conse­
quences. Furthermore, Justin's model for the ideal philosopher is Socrates. 
PARRESIA AND PHILOSOPHICAL IMAGERY IN ACTS 
The noun parresia occurs five times in Acts: once in Peter's post-Pentecost 
speech in Acts 2:29, once of Peter and John in Acts 4:13, two times of the 
early Christian community as a whole in Acts 4:29, 31 as they pray for and 
receive parresia, and finally as the next to last word of the narrative in Acts 
28:31. The term appears in verbal form seven times: twice of Paul in Acts 
9:27 and 28, twice of Paul and Barnabas in Acts 13:46 and 14:3, once of 
Apollos at Ephesus in Acts 18:26, once of Paul at Ephesus in Acts 19:8, and 
once in Acts 26:26, as part of Paul's address to Agrippa, before whom he is 
on trial. 
In her fine study of the term, Sara Winter (1996) argues that the way in 
which parresia is used in Acts shifts from free speech in a civic context in 
Acts 2-4 to a meaning consonant with the later association of parresia with 
the free speech of philosophers, essentially following the historical trajectory 
of the term. I suggest below that all occurrences of the term are consonant 
with the typical use in philosophical topoi. 
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Parresia and opposition in Acts 
In his study of the term in Acts, Willem van Unnik argued that all of the 
occurrences are the result of opposition or lead to opposition-sometimes a 
formal trial but not always (van Unnik 1980: 282). This is considered an over­
statement by Sara Winter (1996: 186-7), but, in my judgment, the overall 
context in which the various instances of the term appear generally bears out 
van Unnik's assessment and is worth stressing. 
The term first appears in Acts at the beginning of the third section of 
Peter's post-Pentecost address in Jerusalem (Acts 2:29). Although Peter's 
speech meets with some success, it eventually leads to the arrest of Peter and 
John for "teaching the people and proclaiming in Jesus the resurrection from 
the dead" (Acts 4:2), which is also the subject of Peter's second public speech 
(Acts 3:11-26). 
The term appears next in the setting of a trial of Peter and John before 
the Jerusalem council (Acts 4:5-21). Following Peter's defense (Acts 4:8-
12), the members of the council are surprised by Peter's and John's boldness 
("rrap11olav") given their status as "uneducated" and "amateurs" (Acts 4:13). 
In the trial they are twice charged to stop their public speaking (Acts 4:18, 
21), after which they are threatened and released. 
Following the trial the Christian community gathers to pray for parresia 
(Acts 4:29). The prayer itself places parresia as a response to opposition by 
citing Psalms 2:1, thus suggesting that opposition to Jesus by kings and rulers 
was predicted by David. The prayer then places Herod, Pontius Pilate, the 
Gentiles, and the people of Israel as the contemporary embodiment of the 
opposition predicted by the psalmist (Acts 4:26). Furthermore, the oppo­
sition is placed "in this city" (ev TD rro.Ae1 TOUTfl), making the opposition 
encountered by the apostles an extension of that encountered by Jesus. The 
prayer then continues, "And now, Lord, take notice of their threats and give 
your slaves the ability to speak your word with all boldness (rrapp11oia5), 
while you stretch out your hand for healing, and signs and portents are taking 
place through the name of your holy child Jesus" (Acts 4:29-30). In Acts 4:31, 
the prayer is granted as the narrator notes that "all were filled with the Holy 
Spirit and were speaking the word of God with boldness (rrapp11oias):' The 
next three scenes focus on the internal life of the community, all of which 
deal in some way with property arrangements. When we see public activity 
again in Acts 5: 12-16 in Solomon's portico, it is followed by an arrest and a 
second trial. 
In Acts 9 the verbal form of the term appears twice.2 It appears for the 
first time as Barnabas describes Saul speaking boldly ("errapp1101aoaTo") in 
Damascus in order to gain acceptance for Saul with the Jerusalem Christian 
community (Acts 9:27). Once accepted by the community, Paul is described 
as speaking boldly ("rrapp11ma<;oµevo5") in Jerusalem as well (Acts 9:28). 
Both instances are linked to opposition: Paul's public preaching in Damascus 
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had incited a Jewish plot to kill him, requiring that Paul flee the city (Acts 
9:23-25); and Paul's public speaking in Jerusalem takes the form of disput­
ing Hellenists, who similarly seek to kill him, again forcing Paul to flee (Acts 
9:29-30). 
The term next appears describing the preaching activity of Paul and Barna­
bas in Antioch and Iconium. In Antioch Paul's preaching is met by opposition 
from Jews who contradict and revile him (Acts 13:44-45), prompting Paul 
and Barnabas to speak out ("rrapprimaoaµevo1"), and in so doing they signal 
a shift in the mission to Gentiles (Acts 13:46-47). While this is well received 
by many Gentiles, some Jews foment persecution against Paul and Barnabas, 
eventually driving them out of the city (Acts 13:49-50). Similar events take 
place at the next stop in lconium: Paul and Barnabas preach in a synagogue 
and are opposed by "unbelieving Jews" (Acts 14:2), but they remain there for 
some time preaching boldly ("mxppT]ata�oµevot") (Acts 14:3) until a coali­
tion of Jews and Gentiles seeks to harm them forcing them to flee. 
The next two instances occur in the context of missionary activity in Ephe­
sus (Acts 18:26; 19:8). Both present some difficulties. In the first instance 
the term appears in verbal form as an infinitive with �p�aTo. It is unclear 
whether this should be understood as indicating that Ephesus marks the 
beginning of Apollos's bold speech or whether the point is that Apollos's bold 
speech is soon interrupted by Priscilla and Aquila.3 In the second instance 
Paul, who returns to Ephesus after Apollos's departure (Acts 19:1), encoun­
ters twelve disciples who, like Apollos, had only John's baptism, and begins to 
speak boldly ("emxpp11ma�eTo") in the synagogue (Acts 19:8). Winter notes 
that neither of these instances can be linked to opposition and violence as 
clearly as previous occurrences: the opposition is absent in the case of Apol­
los's bold speech, and in Paul's case the narrative indicates only disbelief by 
some who were stubborn, prompting Paul to withdraw (S. C. Winter 1996: 
186-7). But within the larger context of the narrative of events in Ephe­
sus the association of parresia with opposition continues. Apollos's public 
speaking in Ephesus, which is continued by Paul, leads to great success (Acts 
19:17, 20), which in turn leads to the riot instigated by Demetrius the silver­
smith (Acts 19:23-41). 
The verb appears again as Paul stands on trial before Festus and Agrippa. 
After Paul's defense, Festus tells Paul that his learning has made him mad. 
Abraham Malherbe (1989) has suggested that both the term parresia and the 
reference to Paul's activity occurring in public were commonplaces of moral 
philosophy. It is also worth noting that, while Paul receives some sympathy 
from Agrippa, the context of the exchange is, in fact, a trial, which is empha­
sized by the reference to Paul's chains (Acts 26:29). 
The final image of Acts has Paul "preaching the kingdom of God and 
teaching about the Lord Jesus Christ with all boldness [µETa TTcl0115 rrap­
priolas J:' while imprisoned, awaiting a trial before Caesar (Acts 28:31). Many 
take the "unhindered" aspect of Paul's bold speech as an indication of his 
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relative freedom while awaiting trial-a form of house arrest (see, for exam­
ple, Haenchen 1971: 276). Richard Cassidy suggests, I think rightly, that this 
final image can be read, rather, as showing that Paul continues to speak boldly 
despite being in prison (Cassidy 1987: 134). This reading is supported also by 
the fact that the outcome of the trial before Caesar implied in the narrative is 
Paul's being sentenced to death (Haenchen 1971: 732, Parsons 2008: 366-7). 
This brief survey shows that in nearly all occurrences in Acts parresia 
is associated with opposition. In a couple of cases the association may not 
be immediate, but opposition is, nonetheless, not far off. Van Unnik rightly 
observes that "it is not so much the opposition which provokes 'freedom of 
speech' on the side of Christians . . .  but their parresia which provokes oppo­
sition and danger" (van Unnik 1980: 282). In so doingparresia functions in a 
way analogous to the parresia exhibited in the philosophic tradition outlined 
at the outset of this essay. 
Parresia and divine commission in Acts 
As is the case in Dio and Epictetus and others, parresia and divine commis­
sion are closely linked in Acts. The public and miraculous manifestation of 
the Holy Spirit in Acts 2 could be said to grant legitimacy to all of the sub­
sequent activity of the apostles in Jerusalem. Similarly, the account of Paul's 
conversion on the road to Damascus (Acts 9: 1-19) functions as an instance 
of divine commissioning for all of Paul's missionary activity in Acts 9:19-31 
and chapters 13-28, in which he is the focus of the narrative. Indeed, divine 
sanction for the Jerusalem leaders and Paul in the form of the presence of the 
Holy Spirit or by means of miraculous manifestations is repeatedly stressed 
in Acts to the point that it borders on redundancy (Barrett 2004: I, 108). 
Divine commission is, of course, a central part of the prophetic tradition on 
which the author of Acts draws. The stress the author places on this through­
out the narrative can be read as evoking both the tradition of prophets com­
missioned by God in the Hebrew Bible and claims of divine commission in 
philosophical discourse. 
The first instance of parresia in Acts 2:29 occurs in Peter's Pentecost 
speech immediately after the outpouring of the Spirit in Acts 2:1-4. Peter's 
address to the Jerusalem council (Acts 4:8-12) results in the Jewish lead­
ers being surprised by Peter's and John's parresia in Acts 4:13. The address 
that occasioned such a response is delivered while Peter is "filled with the 
Holy Spirit" (Acts 4:8). The community's request for parresia in Acts 4:29 is 
granted through a building-rattling manifestation of divine approval (Acts 
4:31). Paul's parresia in Damascus and Jerusalem (Acts 9:27, 29) is preceded 
by the account of Christ's appearance to him on the way to Damascus (Acts 
9:1-19). The missionary activity of Paul and Barnabas, which includes the 
specific notices of their parresia at Antioch (Acts 13:46) and lconium (Acts 
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14:3), is sanctioned in the narrative by the Holy Spirit specifically requesting 
that the two be set aside and commissioned (Acts 13:2-3). 
Apollos's parresia at Ephesus may be the exception to the pattern. Apollos 
is introduced as follows: "He was an eloquent man, and a formidable inter­
preter of the Scriptures. He had been instructed in the way of the Lord and 
being zealous in spirit when he spoke and taught accurately the things con­
cerning Jesus, though he knew only the baptism of John" (Acts 18:25-26). 
If the phrase "zealous in spirit" [i;iwv T� TTveuµaTt] is taken as referring 
to a fiery temperament, then this indeed may be an exception to the pat­
tern. However, if the phrase is translated as "boiling with the Spirit;' then 
the pattern of linking divine favor or commission with parresia is continued 
(Fitzmyer l 998b: 638-9). The next instance is less ambiguous. After Apollos 
leaves for Corinth, Paul returns to Ephesus where he properly baptizes twelve 
disciples who also had only the baptism of John. The Holy Spirit comes upon 
the men after Paul lays his hands on them (Acts 19:5-6). Paul then enters the 
synagogue speaking boldly ("etrapprioiai;ETo") for three months (Acts 19:8). 
While the spirit may not fall directly "on" Paul, it is clear that there is an asso­
ciation between divine power and commission and the ability to speak boldly. 
Paul's bold speech to Agrippa (Acts 26:26) is preceded by a lengthy apology 
in the course of which he tells the king of his encounter with the risen Christ 
on the way to Damascus. That Paul is sent on to Rome by Agrippa is not ulti­
mately the result of Agrippa dutifully following protocol-it is required by 
the Lord's appearance to Paul following his trial in Jerusalem in Acts 23: 11. 
And while the expected trial before Caesar in Rome never occurs, Paul fulfills 
his divine commission in the final verses of Acts, preaching the Kingdom of 
God with parresia, despite being in prison (Acts 28:31). 
The Socratic model in Acts 
As in Dio Chrysostom and other philosophers outlined above, in Acts 
parresia is used as one element in a complex of philosophical commonplaces, 
including the evocation of the figure of Socrates directly. Acts' use of philo­
sophical imagery is extensive. Alexander has recently argued that much of 
the general outline of the portrayal of Paul in Acts is influenced by traditions 
about Socrates-what she calls the "Socratic paradigm:· Alexander identified 
the following similarities: (a) the prominence of Paul's "call" in Acts 9, 22, 26 
as the beginning of Paul's mission is similar to the function of the oracle at 
Delphi as the beginning of Socrates' mission; (b) Paul's divine call authorizes 
his mission just as Socrates' call authorizes his mission; (c) both Socrates and 
Paul have divine guidance throughout their missions; (d) the missions of both 
involve significant tribulations; (e) both Socrates' and Paul's obedience to the 
divine call leads to persecution; (f) the careers of both culminate in trials that 
make up a disproportionate amount of the tradition surrounding each figure; 
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and (g) both Socrates and Paul end their lives in prison, despite which they 
continue to teach until the end (L. C. A. Alexander l 993b: 57-63). 
A number of smaller scenes in Acts also draw on Socratic or philosophi­
cal imagery and commonplaces.4 Interpreters have long acknowledged, for 
example, that in describing Paul's visit to Athens in Acts 17:16-21 the author 
attributed to Paul strikingly Socratic features. Paul arrives at philosophy's 
symbolic center and, like Socrates, engages in discussions (dialegomai) with 
people he happens to meet (entungchano) in the market place (agora) and is 
subsequently accused of introducing strange teachings (see Sandnes 1993; 
Given 1996; Reis 2002; Barrett 2004: I, 828-9). In addition, the descriptions 
of the early Christian community in the summaries of Acts 2 and 4 evoke 
Greek utopian philosophical traditions. More specifically, they evoke Socra­
tes' description of the ideal polis in Plato's Republic (Dupertuis 2005; Mealand 
1977; Sterling 1992b). 
At several points the term parresia appears in Acts in the context of trials 
or trial-like scenes, which, in my judgment, are all shaped more significantly 
by Plato's and Xenophon's writings about Socrates than by any historical 
sources the author might have received. The trial in Acts 4:5-22 is a case 
in point. The Jewish council's surprise at Peter's and John's parresia is con­
nected to their being perceived as "aypaµµaT01" and '11cS1wTai" (Acts 4:13), 
which are probably best rendered as "unlettered, unable to write" and "ama­
teurs, non-specialists" (Fitzmyer 1998b: 302). The characterization of Peter 
and John here as uneducated simpletons serves, as Winter notes, "not only 
to contrast them implicitly with their educated and refined interlocutors but 
also to evoke the memory of Socrates' ironic claim to be wise" (S. C. Winter 
1996: 190). In the course of the brief trial that ensues, Peter and John are 
charged to stop speaking and teaching publicly (Acts 4:18), a request simi­
lar to the one made by the Athenian jury to Socrates (Plato, Apo/. 29c-d). 
Socrates' defense is more specifically evoked when Peter and John refuse to 
stop teaching with the statement: "Whether it is right in the sight of God to 
listen to you rather than to God, you must judge" (Acts 4: 19). This statement, 
essentially repeated in the trial that follows in Acts 5:29, bears striking simi­
larity to Socrates' statement in Plato's Apology: "Men of Athens, I respect and 
love you, but I shall obey the god rather than you, and while I live and am able 
to continue, I shall never give up philosophy or stop exhorting you and point­
ing out the truth to any one of you whom I may meet" (Apol. 29d; Fowler, 
trans). The echo of Plato's Apology here is probably direct and intentional 
(Barrett 2004: I, 237). This first formal trial in Acts, then, places the apostles' 
parresia in the context of opposition, deems it the result of divine commis­
sion, and directly links the Christians' free speech to Socratic imagery and 
philosophical commonplaces.5 
The final scenes in Acts 28:23-31-containing the last occurrence of 
parresia-are also modeled on Socrates' famous trial. Alexander notes that 
both Socrates and Paul end their careers in prison after lengthy trials (L. C. A. 
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Alexander l 993b: 60-63). The similarities can be carried further. After being 
sentenced to death by the Athenian jury, Plato's Socrates addresses two 
groups, those who voted for his execution and the large minority that voted 
to acquit him. He first addresses those who condemned him, prophesying 
their punishment in the form of numerous followers of Socrates who would 
continue to push them towards self-examination (Apol. 39c-d). The second 
group consists of his friends, with whom he asks to speak "while the authori­
ties are occupied and before I go to the place where I must die. Men, wait 
[rrapaµEtVOTE) with me for this much time, for nothing hinders [oucS£v ... 
KCUAUEt) our talking with each other as long as possible" (Apo/. 39e). Paul 
also addresses two groups in the final section of Acts. First he addresses the 
Roman Jewish leaders who, like the Athenian jury's response to Socrates, 
were split in their response to Paul. He quotes Isaiah 6:9-10 as an oracle pre­
dicting their doom. Then, like Socrates, he turns to his friends, spending his 
final two years in the company of those who came to him. The final two enig­
matic verses of Acts are similar to Socrates' request to speak with his friends 
after his sentencing: 
Apo/. 39e 
Men, wait [rrapaµelvaTE] with 
me for this much time, 
for nothing hinders [ oucS£v ... 
KCUAUE t) our talking with each 
other as long as possible. 
Acts 28:30-31 
He resided [sveµe1vev]for two years in his 
own rented house and received everyone 
who came to him, preaching the kingdom 
of God and teaching about the Lord Jesus 
Christ with all boldness [ rrappT)otas )
­
unhindered [ CxKCUAUTCUS'). 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
I have tried to show that the term parresia occurs in Acts in ways analogous 
to the use and function of the term in philosophical imagery in the first two 
centuries CE. As in writers like Dio Chrysostom, Musonius Rufus, and Lucian 
it is one part of a set of philosophical commonplaces which include the asso­
ciation of parresia and opposition, the claim of a divine commission author­
izing the right to speak with parresia, and the cultivation of the philosophical 
persona by means of explicit assimilation to the figure of Socrates. 
The similarities raise a number of questions about the possible function 
of the philosophical imagery and the implications for reading Acts. On one 
level it is easy to see the appropriation of philosophical imagery in the nar­
rative in the context of second century apology, illustrated by writers like 
Justin Martyr for whom philosophical imagery is part of a rhetorical strat­
egy designed to respond to criticism of Christians and secure political rights. 
Robert Wilken has argued that philosophical imagery is central to the pres­
entation of Christianity in Justin and other second-century Christian authors 
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because it functioned as the opposite of the label of superstition, a label from 
which the authors were trying to disassociate (Wilken 1970). Here it is worth 
noting that the author of Acts places a critique of the Athenians' supersti­
tion (deisidaimonesterous) on the lips of Paul in Acts 17:22. Malherbe (1989) 
has suggested that the philosophical commonplaces in Acts 26:26 should be 
viewed as an early version of this argument. Given the extent of philosophi­
cal imagery in Acts, this suggestion should probably be pressed further. But 
rather than viewing the use of philosophical imagery in Acts simply as a pre­
cursor of what was to come with writers such as Justin, it is probably better 
to see Acts as reflecting a similar cultural environment. One need not assume 
a second-century date for Acts for such an argument to hold. The influence 
of the figure of Socrates in shaping the noble death traditions as taken up in 
Jewish-Hellenistic literature, such as 2 and 4 Maccabees and in Luke's story 
of Jesus' passion, suggests such deployment was in effect long before the 
second century (Sterling 2001). Acts, then, might be seen as a roughly analo­
gous narrative counterpart to Justin's argument that Christianity is not a base 
superstition, but a movement that has from its beginnings been led by true 
philosophers. 
In addition, reading Acts alongside the literature of the second century, 
including the literature of the Second Sophistic in which the topos of the phi­
losopher vs the tyrant functions as a part of a complex cultural negotiation 
of Greek identity under Roman rule (Gilbert 2006; Whitmarsh 2001; Swain 
1996), highlights the choice in Acts to present apostolic agonistic encoun­
ters with authorities, be they Jewish or Roman. The literature of the Second 
Sophistic can certainly be read as an attempt by Greek elites to explore their 
complex relationship and positioning with Roman imperial structures, and 
these authors can certainly be critical of Rome, as Lucian appears to be in 
Nigrinus, where he contrasts Rome with an idealized Athens (Gilbert 2006: 
95-6).6 That said, one cannot view the use of philosophical topoi in Acts as a 
straightforward appropriation of Greek identity in the service of "resistance" 
to Roman rule, however broadly defined. 
There is a tendency in scholarship on Acts to limit the "backgrounds" and 
comparanda to first-century texts and materials, but this is limiting given the 
general paucity of philosophical materials that survive from that era. Reading 
Acts in the second century, as I have demonstrated, opens up ways of seeing 
that can highlight aspects, patterns, and emphases in the narrative that might 
otherwise not be visible as clearly or at all. The more openly and expansively 
we allow ourselves to read Acts, the more we can learn about the ways in which 
early Christians imagined themselves into the worlds in which they lived. 
NOTES 
1. See Fields (2009) for a helpful discussion of a number of terms and their opposites often 
used in association with parresia. 
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2. Although I discus  the noun and verb forms interchangeably, there are some peculiarities 
in how they appear that are at least worth noting. 'The noun appears in the cluster of four 
instances in Acts 2-4 and again describing Paul awaiting trial at the end of the narrative in 
Acts 28:31. All of the instances of the verb occur in the sections of the narrative in which 
Paul is the central character (Acts 13-28). And all but one occur in reference to Paul; the 
exception is Apollos's parresia in Acts 18:26. 
3. This is also the only time in Acts that parresia is attributed to someone other than Paul in 
the sections of the narrative devoted to his activity in Acts 13-28. One could also argue 
that this instance is the only time after Paul's conversion in Acts 9 that rrapp11ola is attrib­
uted to anyone other than Paul. The two instances in Acts 13:46 and 14:3 include Barnabas, 
but Paul is clearly the principle actor. 
4. Given Socrates' later role as the paradigmatic philosopher, making a clear distinction 
between evoking traditions about Socrates or more diffuse philosophical topoi is at times 
difficult if not impossible. 
5. MacDonald has recently argued that the trial scenes in Acts 22-26 are directly modeled 
on Plato's and Xenophon's accounts of the trial and death of Socrates (MacDonald 2006). It 
is also worth noting that Luke's changes to Mark's narrative of the trial and death of Jesus 
serve to place his death in line with traditions of the "noble death# more generally and of 
Socrates more specifically (Kloppenborg 1992; Sterling 2001). 
6. But, as Fields points out, the interpretive difficulties of this dialogue at least open the "pos­
sibility that this work may even be mocking grand ideas about 'Greek philosophical resist­
ance"' (Fields 20 9: 5). 
